Did the Vatican Lose its Chip?

I can't help but wonder how the recent re-election of Ma Ying-jeou in Taiwan will affect the relationship between the Vatican, the PRC, and the ROC.

The Boston Pilot, America’s oldest Catholic newspaper, states that:

"In its asymmetrical struggle to protect the religious freedom of the more than 10 million Catholics in mainland China, one of the Vatican's few bargaining chips is its willingness to establish diplomatic ties with the Chinese government. The Vatican has long made it clear that it would grant recognition to China and downgrade its ties with the rival island nation of Taiwan, in return for guarantees of religious freedom, including the pope's ability to choose Chinese Catholic bishops without state interference."[1]

My question is, what happens when the ROC and the PRC seem to be getting along? In this type of scenario, is the Vatican going to lose its main bargaining chip?

Recent events seem to indicate that it will not. In spite of Ma's efforts to improve cross-strait relations, the relationship between the ROC and the Vatican appears to be as strong as ever. At the end of 2011,

Cardinal Grocholewski, prefect of the Congregation for Catholic Education, signed a higher education agreement with the Taiwanese government.[2] Under the agreement, titles and degrees bestowed by Fu Jen University (the only pontifical university in the PRC/ROC/HK area) will finally have local recognition. This recognition extends beyond the community in Taiwan to more than 150 other pontifical universities worldwide, giving Fu Jen University additional funding opportunities. This could well put the university in the position to become the top destination for theological discourse in East Asia.

Indeed, there are some strong correlations between recent statements made by the Pope and those made by President Ma in response to the world economic crisis. In his recent "State of the World" address, Pope Benedict XVI emphasized that the Church must focus on education. Mr. Wang Yu-Yuan, Ambassador to the Holy See from Taiwan, says that the Pope sees young people as the "key to securing a future of hope, despite a present gloom."[3] President Ma, in his 2012 New Year address, agrees, saying that part of the task of a democratic government is "to light candles in the minds of the next generation, so that they shine their light"[4]

All of this, however, raises questions about the viability of seeing Taiwan as the Vatican's "bargaining chip." Even within the Vatican diplomatic circles, there is considerable debate on the ethical implications of the Pope's prior overture to China. Influential American Catholic George Weigel states that "cutting ties with democratic Taiwan could pose 'grave questions' about the church’s stance on human rights," a matter that continues to be the subject of debate between Vatican hawks and doves.[5] 

Furthermore- and perhaps as proof of Weigel's concerns- as the Vatican's relationship with Taiwan improves, its relationship with China appears to be deteriorating.  Within the last year and a half, the Chinese government has proven increasingly unwilling to allow the Vatican any say in the consecration of new Catholic bishops. The issue came to a head in the summer of 2011, when the Vatican excommunicated Father Joseph Huang Bingzhang, a Chinese priest that the government had installed as bishop in Shantou, Guangdong.[6] The Chinese government's response was swift and derisive, proclaiming the Vatican’s actions to be “unreasonable and rude.”[7] This state of affairs has continued to decline since then. In fact, in January of 2012, the Vatican released a statement, calling on the Chinese government to explain the disappearances of three Vatican-approved bishops and six priests. The government has denied any knowledge of the issue, leaving the international Catholic blogs to run rampant with speculation.

So is the Vatican going to lose its main bargaining chip? Well. It’s not a question of losing a legitimate bargaining chip. Taiwan was, at one time, a legitimate bargaining mechanism that could be effectively employed against the Chinese government for political, religious, and even ethical concerns. But, the value of any currency, including that of a bargaining chip, can change. The fact is, the change of relationship between Taiwan and the Chinese government has changed the value of that particular lucre that the Vatican had heretofore employed with at least some success.

So, what does that mean for the future? I can at least say, with some degree of certainty, that the Vatican will have to rethink the efficacy of the Taiwan chip. That is not to say that it cannot still be wielded in the future, but it goes without saying that it no longer will bear the same weight as it has in the past. Just as changes in economic prosperity can impact the value of currency in world economics, so too can changes in political climate and relationships change the value “chips” that constitute the currency of political and ethical negotiation.

While Taiwan’s ties with the Vatican will no doubt continue to strengthen, there will be an indisputable impact on the Vatican’s ability to leverage that relationship due to the rise of Taiwan’s strengthening ties with the PRC.  Good or bad? Arguments can be made for both points of view, but what’s important is to recognize that things are changing. For the Vatican, that may require rethinking a tried but true tool that will no longer perform in the same way that it has in the past.

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[1] The Boston Pilot

[2] The Cardinal in Taiwan

[3] Pope Benedict XVI and the State of the World

[4] President Ma's New Year Address 2012

[5] George Weigel

[6] Excommunication of Chinese Priest

[7] Xinhua's Response to Excommunication

Twitter Twatter

There's been a lot of talk recently about Twitter's decision to start censoring users' tweets in China.

Twitter CEO Dick Costolo defends his decision by saying that the new policy aims to promote transparency, not to enable government censorship.  “You can’t reside in countries and not operate within the law," he says.

Maybe I'm out of line, but that's the most ridiculous excuse for a bad policy I've ever heard. 

"Ethics" implicitly regulates areas and details of behavior that lie beyond governmental control.  By claiming that they are relying on oppressive authoritarian regimes to define the parameters of acceptable business practice, Costolo is in essence allowing these regimes to police his own sense of business ethics.  In fact, he's going so far as to let them define his ethics for him, at the expense of not only the Chinese people, but the reputation of a company that had always seemed to value free and open communication. 

Sad.

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See:

Costolo's WSJ Interview

Revolt in a Time of Mixed Communication

"The single biggest problem in communication is the illusion that it has taken place." -George Bernard Shaw


In her new book, Protest with Chinese Characteristics, Ho-fung Hung argues that the recent protests in Wukan and Haimen*  should not be taken as radical democratic movements against a harsh, authoritarian regime, but rather "should be understood in light of this longstanding Confucianist conception of authority."** Hung elaborates:

"Under this conception, abused subjects have a right to fight corrupt officials by any means necessary, but they should also count on the emperor as the loving grand patriarch to redress the injustice, just like children abused by their parents should look to their grandparents or lineage elders for paternalist protection."

Hung goes on to analyze the portrayal of imperial authority in recent historical dramas and popular TV series, linking the Confucian conception of filial piety and the peoples' relationship with the emperor to modern buzzwords like 'justice' and 'popular trust.' She draws on some very interesting examples from recent media in order to illustrate her point- that the protests in Wukan and Haimen do not necessarily herald the beginnings of a mass anti-authoritarian movement, that they actually fall within the boundaries of acceptable Confucian social practice.

The question I must address to Hung, however, is this: How long can 'equitable' social relations- of the kind encompassed by the filial ideal- stand up to the notion of 'equal' social relations?

A number of highly respected scholars of Confucianism- Henry Rosemont, Jr, W. Theodore de Bary, Roger T Ames, and others- have repudiated attempts to equate Chinese and Western modes of juridical/ethical thought. The notion of individual rights as we in the West understand it, they agree, does not exist in China.*** The functional notion of rights in the Confucian context is based in social relations (emperor-subject, parent-child, husband-wife, etc), not the dignity and autonomy of the human person (don't jump on me for this; I will clarify this point if necessary). Here, everything appears to point toward Hung's thesis. And I agree! In a purely Confucian culture, Wukan and Haimen would be considered perfectly filial and respectful examples of community-centered pursuits of equitable treatment and general well-being- not at all anarchist or democratic.

HOWEVER, China is no longer a purely Confucian culture. The historical dramas that Hung mentions are rife with anti-Confucian hints of feminism, and are interspersed with shows like "Rent a Girlfriend" (租个女友回家过年) and the dating show "Take Me Out" (我们约会吧), not to mention contributions from the unbelievably pervasive Western DVD black market. With new ideas of what is "just" pushing the boundaries of Confucian notions of equity, is it illogical to assume that intercultual communication will eventually lead to a certain amount of 'metaphor bundling'? That is, if children who grow up watching "Rent a Girlfriend" and "White Collar" and "Friends" begin to use the ideas found in these shows to inform their own view of the ideal society... well. I'm not sure that historical dramas can necessarily compete.

The protests in Wukan and Haimen centered around specific regional issues- illegitimate land grabs and heavy industrial pollution, respectively. I agree with Hung that they represent a certain demographic among the protest movement. But then what can we make of cartoons like Kuang Kuang's Diary- a creepy cross between South Park and Saladfingers, showcasing a bloody-nosed boy's vengeful fantasies of blowing up his school?*** The anger and frustration directed toward the Chinese educational system, especially among junior high and high school students, is deep and widespread. Does Hung's idea of 'protest with Chinese characteristics' hold true in this case? What happens when little Kuang Kuang graduates from blowing up schools to blowing up government buildings?

I find Hung's analysis of the history of protests in China well-researched and insightful. At the same time, I cannot help but wonder whether or not the "grassroots contenders" that Hung describes are in fact following accepted Confucian practices, or are already "revving up."

Comments and corrections are welcome.
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* The BBC on Wukan
   Haimen's Connections to Wukan

**Columbia University Press Blog

***See Human Rights and the World's Religions (ed.Leroy S Rouner) or Confucian Ethics: A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy, and Community (ed Kwong-loi Shun & David B Wong)

****Danwei on Kuang Kuang "Blowing Up the School"